Cambria Press Publication Review – A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia

Cambria Press publication review.jpg
Cambria Press Publication Review for A New Strategy for Complex Warfare

Congratulations to Colonel Thomas Drohan (PhD, Princeton University), Head of the Department of Military & Strategic Studies at the United States Air Force (USAF) Academy, on the outstanding review by the journal Parameters of his book, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia.

This book, which is part of the new Cambria Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security Studies (RCSS) Series (general editor: Dr. Geoffrey R. H. Burn), was published by Cambria Press in 2016 and launched at the ISA and AAS conferences.

The review notes that “in placing weapons-centric strategic changes front and center, policymakers are putting the cart before the horse. Thankfully Drohan, a scholar with a doctorate from Princeton who now heads the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy after years of his own military service, is in a unique position to bridge this gap between academic theorists and policy practitioners, a task he successfully accomplishes.”

It commends the book because it “does much of the heavy lifting required for acquiring a proper understanding of Asian security cultures. Few works have succeeded as much as this one at succinctly explaining centuries of Asian cultural history and contextualizing that history to current security issues in the region. Members of the security community will greatly benefit from this unique perspective.”

The review also emphasizes how “Drohan does not simply provide policymakers with pages of historical detail and no guidelines for determining its relevance. He excels in explaining the implications cultural histories have for US security strategy and prescribes both philosophical and pragmatic changes practitioners should make.”

Buy A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia for only $29.95 today on Amazon.

China’s Response to Territorial Disputes

The Economist recently reported that “the Permanent Court of Arbitration, an international tribunal in The Hague, has declared China’s “historic claims” in the South China Sea invalid. It was an unexpectedly wide-ranging and clear-cut ruling, and it has enraged China.” As the region and the United States anxiously await China’s response, Colonel Thomas Drohan’s new book, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia, provides useful insights in gauging China’s possible reactions.

East Asia Warfare Strategy

The book’s concept of combined effects warfare shows how Chinese strategy in East Asia is so effective against the combined arms-heavy approach of the US such as in recent “rebalancing,” relative weaknesses in the key US-Japan alliance and mounting Chinese capabilities account for the timing of Chinese actions; and Chinese security culture explains why China pursues a strategy of blending confrontation with cooperation. It explains contemporary China’s combined-effects approach to complex warfare, specifically which includes the kind of persistent reexpansion we are seeing in the South China Sea:

“Current operations seek to fragment rivals on China’s borders and occupy China-claimed territories with complex invasions…Party operations play an existential role in constructing and justifying both an intuitive moral order and a central authority. Major combined-effects offensives include:

  1. a) Military, economic, and political operations to reorient Taiwan toward the mainland
  2. b) Diplomatic partnering with the Soviet Union, then conducting ideological warfare against it
  3. c) Support of Vietnam, and then warfare against it to ensure cliental loyalty to China
  4. d) Seizure of disputed Southeast Asian territory while expanding ties with claimants
  5. e) Incursions in Japan-claimed territory while increasing ties with Japan and the U.S.
  6. f) Maritime reclamation (dredging) operations create, occupy, and militarize new territory.

China’s leaders value holistic, sustainable operations, consistent with the assumption that threats are permanent and any elimination of them are temporary…”

The book also explains how how the limitations of of the US-Japan alliance empower China’s combined-effect strategy in the South China Sea.

“However, the limits of the US-Japan alliance–such as restricting Japanese defense to its own territory– facilitate China’s desired combined effect. Thus, China does not have to integrate its problematic effects of masking its predatory intent while increasing its military-economic strength, stirring anti-Japanese nationalism that does not empower Chinese democracy, and isolating Japan from US intervention, as long as Japan and the United States are complying with these effects anyway.”

In addition, the book helpfully explains why China’s strategy emphasizes military and economic confrontation (in the South China Sea)– while at the same time claiming to be all about harmony and peace as China follows up the UN Tribunals ruling again them with threats to establish an ADIZ and use all of that to “negotiate” its expanding new normal.

“Chinese security culture can help us understand continuity in Chinese strategies and why elites cannot afford to fold in the face of foreign pressure if they are to retain domestic influence. Confrontational sovereignty claims trump tangible benefits of cooperative interdependence. Moral order, central authority, and territorial integrity persist as highly valued interests, particularly among China’s single-Party leadership. So while modernization has strengthened national capabilities, it has also increased national willpower. When China has had the capability to engage other powers as an equal or more, it has done so. We can infer that military equality is the PLA’s precondition for expanding military-to-military relations with the U.S. The loss of ideological sovereignty in the past has become the consensus threat to national security. Ideological sovereignty is closely connected to economic nationalism.”

A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia is part of the  Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series, headed by Dr. Geoffrey R. H. Burn.

Follow us on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

 

 

 

A New Strategy for Complex Warfare

As proactive competitors evolve techniques to circumvent US strengths, it is clear that the profession of arms needs to become a profession of effects. This study by Colonel Thomas Drohan intends to overcome three American weaknesses of strategy making.

A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia develops new theory for superior strategy in complex warfare. The approach is comprehensive and practical, and it is applied to three contemporary security crises involving the United States, China, the Koreas, and Japan.

See this new book at The Scholar’s Choice booth at the #ISA2016 conference in Atlanta and at the Cambria Press booth at the AAS 2016 conference in Seattle. This book will also be at the Cambria Press booth at #APSA2016 conference in Philadelphia and at ISSS at the University of Notre Dame.East Asia Warfare Strategy

The following quotes are excerpts from the book.

Why look to East Asia?

“East Asian strategists have adopted holistic approaches to countering threats for over two thousand years. Confrontation and cooperation in China, the Koreas, and Japan coexist as a way of warfare—such as coercion and persuasion. In today’s globalized security environment where weapons of influence are diverse and accessible, strategists need to consider more than precision-guided lethality.”

What can we apply from Sun Zi to modern warfare?

“Ideas from Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz continue to be relevant because they deal with human aspects of war, such as deception and uncertainty. … Sun Zi advocated a way of warfare that conserved resources. The pinnacle of generalship, the “army attack plan” (shang bing fa muo 上兵伐謀), was breaking an opponent’s will without fighting. Attacking the enemy’s strategy was best; the next attack priority, alliances; then fielded armies; and walled cities as a last resort. These do not have to be carried out in a sequence; they can be applied simultaneously as multiple lines of effect with variable speed, direction, and duration.”

What sort of tactics can we expect from North Korea?

“Kim Jong-un appears intent on managing external relationships with byeongjin (parallel progress)—nuclear weapons and economic growth. We can expect to see confrontation and cooperation to Defend and Deter threats to the hereditary regime, nuclear status, and, problematically, economic independence. Pyongyang’s cyber attacks on South Korean banks in March 2013, Sony Pictures Entertainment USA in November 2014, and landmine, rocket, and artillery attacks against South Korea in August 2015 reflect the regime’s aggressive-dependent security culture. Attempts to Coerce and Compel main power behavior are likely to continue as a compatible complement to Pyongyang’s combined-effects strategy.”

On inferior allied strategy toward North Korea

“The efforts did Compel limited inspections of North Korean nuclear sites and Persuade Pyongyang to participate in talks with South Korea. However all of this operational-level activity fell rather nicely  within the enabling conditions of Pyongyang’s strategic lines of effect.”

On North Korea’s superior strategy

“Pyongyang repeatedly turned American concessions into baselines for further demands. Creating divisive, therefore negotiable, issues strengthened the power of the nuclear option. […] Focused on Deterring, Coercing and Defending, American tough-talk ignored Dissuading and Inducing as compatible elements of a grand strategy. In Pyongyang, however, arguments for nuclear development, and against inspections and negotiations, fit in as the dispensable Persuasion-Inducement piece of its broader combined effect. […]  Thus, escalation favored Pyongyang’s asymmetric, two-track envelopment strategy, as long as it could intimidate and punish American will to stop the nuclear program… The United States set itself on an incremental path of escalatory options subsumed by Pyongyang’s broader strategy. […]  Pyongyang would engage SK on eventual reunification to Deter the nuclear compliance demanded by the United States, and engage the United States on denuclearization to Deter the independent political-economic role that South Korea sought. Pyongyang basked in Seoul’s Sunshine Policy that assured access to separated families and government ministries, and shaded itself from UN demands of special inspections that assured access to stored fuel rods. […]As American officials sparred over whether to cooperate or whether to confront, North Korea Deterred and Defended the viability of its nuclear weapons development program. Demonstrations of will and capability Coerced allied acquiescence.”

When did China’s Coercive presence in the Paracels begin?

“In 1974 China preempted Vietnamese control of the Paracels by dispatching fishermen to occupy them. The PLA Navy defeated arriving South Vietnamese naval forces, establishing administrative control. Against Hanoi’s claim in the Spratlys, China followed its punitive invasion of Vietnam (1979) with drilling operations contracted through international energy corporations. Through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Beijing established a survey outpost in 1987. This drew Vietnamese countersurveys and more naval engagements. The PLA Navy won its Coercive presence.”

How did China and Taiwan strategies interact?

“The broad features of Chinese security culture can help us understand sovereignty issues, particularly in the Taiwan Strait. … To anticipate how China and Taiwan strategies interacted, we examine the logic of the two strategies and then derive key linkages going into the 1995 crisis. Beijing fashioned a dilemma of Persuasion and Deterrence, aggravated by Inducement. China Persuaded unification through assurances of economic benefits, while Deterring independence with intimidating costs. If Taiwan sovereignty leaned toward declaring independence, a demonstration of force sought to Induce the dilemma. Beijing had to sustain this effect to integrate Taiwan into China economically.”

How do China and Taiwan strategies interact now?

“In 2015, a militarily confident China began constructing and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a new reality with which prospective borrowers can align. Across the Strait, China’s broadened bullying polarized politics in Taiwan again, increasing support for the Democratic Progressive Party now led by Tsai Ing-wen. Like her predecessors who opposed Kuomintang coziness with authoritarian China, she is proindependent democracy and pro-cross-Strait status quo.”

On China’s superior strategy toward Taiwan

“China vied for more advantages than just improving military operations to Coerce Taiwan. China seeks to contain Taiwan through regional control…In contrast, Taiwan military exercises focused narrowly on how better to Defend against PLA operations.”

On China’s domestic problem with waging complex warfare

“The downside for Beijing is that the new tools may threaten as well as strengthen party control in different areas of China. To deal with this, General Secretary and President Xi Jinping consolidated power through reforms that institutionalize national development under party leadership, in populist terms. […] Chinese leaders need to retain popular support of this vision to justify complex warfare against Japan and the United States…four possibilities illustrate how Beijing’s proactive strategy seeks to exploit Tokyo’s separated lines of effect…All of these scenarios could be conducted by distributed cyber operations that inflame flash-mob opposition to Japanese claims.”

What about Japan and its security culture?

“With regard to the military and other tools used to achieve desired effects, Japanese security culture contains significant challenges. Retooling to confront threats has been technically successful, but engagement according to Japanese norms has met external resistance and proven to be unsustainable. Japan’s employment of national power after periods of isolation has not produced success. Yet in the ongoing Senkaku crisis, reintroducing the military tool is regarded domestically as a balanced response to Chinese aggression.”

On Japan’s controversial security options

“In all domains including cyber, preventative effects are unlikely to be credible unless accompanied by causative options. Japan’s sensible alternatives to manage threats include more offensive combined-arms capabilities in the U.S.-Japan alliance, not less. […] The situation demands leaders who can create cooperative effects, or at least restrain the scope of confrontational operations. Someone has to plan for peace. For Japan, enforcing discipline in the face of Chinese baiting is needed to prevent and contain conflict. For China, knowing how far to push territorial claims without provoking sustainable Japanese rearmament is necessary to shape a future that does not include a permanently hostile Japan.”

What can the U.S. learn from East Asian security cultures?

“The three East Asian security cultures and crises featured in this book offer a profound lesson for US policy makers, strategists, and operators: The ability to orchestrate combined effects creates strategic advantages in cooperative-confrontational interactions. This critical will and capability can be used to establish priorities that connect operational missions to national success.”

A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia
Thomas A. Drohan
9781604979206  ·  326pp.  ·  Paperback $29.95  ·  Order now from Amazon

Conflict Security
A New Strategy for Complex Warfare is part of the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Geoffrey R.H. Burn).

 

 

#APSA2015 Meet Tom Cronin & Michael Genovese @CambriaPress Booth TODAY

#APSA2015 Cambria Press author publication Michael Genovese Thomas Cronin

#APSA2015 Cambria Press Booth (705) at 10 a.m. on Friday: Meet Thomas Cronin, Michael Genovese, and the authors behind The Quest for Leadership

Meet Thomas E. Cronin, Michael Genovese, and the authors behind The Quest for Leadership today at 10 a.m. at the Cambria Press booth (705) in the #APSA2015 book exhibit hall. You might be one of the lucky ones to get a complimentary, signed copy of this brand-new publication!

The book launch for The Quest for Leadership took place last night at the APSA Presidential and Executive Politics (PEP) reception. Authored by some of the nation’s top scholars and led by distinguished political scientist Michael A. Genovese, this publication honors eminent political scientist Thomas E. Cronin for his significant contributions to the fields of political science and leadership.

Cambria Press Publication:
The Quest for Leadership
(CHAPTER EXCERPTS)

Chapter 1: Hitting the Ground Running Twice (Meenekshi Bose

“The three case studies presented here illustrate some instructive parallels between the two presidencies. Both Bush and Obama succeeded in enacting one of their top policy priorities—education and health-care reform, respectively—early in their first terms by setting clear goals and negotiating with Congress to pass legislation. Bush engaged in bipartisan negotiations while Obama pursued intra-party negotiations, but both presidents were willing to make compromises to achieve results. In their second terms, though, both presidents did not have similar success with their policy agendas of Social Security reform for Bush and immigration reform for Obama. Why were they unable to hit the ground running again?”

Chapter 2: Leadership and the Tending of Coalitions (Bruce Miroff)

“Paying attention to the tending of coalitions is essential if one wishes to understand what shapes presidential purposes and drives presidential actions. Presidents pursuing strongly felt policy preferences are likely to temper their own aspirations with recognition of the need to incorporate the preferences of their most essential supporters. For cases in which presidents’ policy preferences are more prudential than personal, the preferences of coalition members are likely to assume an even greater role in executive choices. For the presidency, facing as it does such a wide-ranging array of policy concerns, the latter situation may well be more common than the former.”

Chapter 3: President as War-Time Leader (David Gray Adler)

“The trajectory of thought among modern presidents on the question of legal and constitutional limits on executive power, in either initiating war or conducting it, is a flat line. For more than a half century, presidents of both parties—Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals alike—have assumed the authority to initiate and direct war is exclusively executive in nature. That position, now firmly ingrained in presidential remarks at press conferences, in cabinet members’ testimony before congressional committees and in the opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, has no footing in the text of the Constitution, the discussions and debates in the Constitutional Convention and the various state ratifying conventions, the Federalist Papers and other contemporaneous documents that accompanied the drafting and signing of the Constitution. Nor does the argument find any traction in opinions delivered by the US Supreme Court. We have reached a point in American history where presidents and their lawyers pay little or no heed to constitutional principles that, 200 years ago, sought to prevent presidential war-making. Indeed, the practice of war making in the United States today bears no resemblance to the Constitution.

Chapter 4: Reflections on the State of Presidential Leadership and Authority (Victoria A. Farrar-Myers)

“If norms, or shared understandings of expected behavior, continue to demand the exercise of presidential leadership after Obama leaves office, regardless of who holds the office of president, then the primary source of leadership within the American political system will remain entrenched in the White House. But if the understandings of expected presidential behavior cease to be shared widely, then the federal government may appear rudderless, both domestically and internationally, in the absence of Congress picking up the mantle of leadership; a situation with which we are all too familiar.

Chapter 5: Mistaking the Moment and Misperceiving the Opportunity (Lara M. Brown

“Neustadt argued that “Congress, institutionally, is suspicious” of the White House and that members compete “for control of the federal agencies, their programs, and their budgets.” Noting that the “courteous manners and procedural accommodations” are only temporary, he implied that the legislative alliances formed in those first heady months are more fragile than they appear because of these politicians’ differing constituencies and electoral demands. As such, presidents expecting enduring loyalty from fellow partisans in Congress, according to Neustadt’s observations, are likely to be disappointed. Beyond all of these issues, partisan polarization marks every aspect of today’s politics. From an electorate less likely to look past party labels and cast split tickets to the vastly different presidential approval ratings that vary by party affiliation to the nontrivial levels of fear and loathing of opposition partisans that are measured in surveys, American politics have become more than a team sport. Each day seems to be a rivalry grudge match. Not unlike the iconic Hatfield and McCoy feud, distrust and suspicion are pervasive between the parties. Negotiations are fraught with irrational, spiteful, and petty behaviors. Rhetoric and optics now seem to trump accomplishments. In sum, doing matters less than posturing. Posturing for what? Why the next election, of course.”

Chapter 6: Presidents Bush and Obama and the Surveillance of Americans (James P. Pfiffner

“Since the atrocities of 9/11, the US intelligence community has vastly expanded in size and scope; and with the growth of the internet, the technological capacity of the US government to collect information and communications of US citizens has increased exponentially. President George W. Bush initially authorized surveillance of Americans without the warrants required in law, based on his claimed inherent Article II powers. Congress later included some of these surveillance programs in law. President Obama, before he came to office, expressed some criticism about the Bush programs and wanted to place limits on government surveillance of Americans. But once he was in office, he embraced existing surveillance programs as necessary to protect US national security. When the extent of some of these programs was unveiled by Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013, people concerned with civil liberties expressed alarm at the scope of these programs.”

Chapter 7: Leading the Public/ Following the Public (Todd L. Belt)

“The president is the most visible politician in the US, and much has been made of his ability to influence public opinion. From advocating for certain policies, to leading the country to war, to consoling the nation during times of crises, the president is the nation’s foremost political communicator. But he can only lead the nation so far, and sometimes his efforts have been resisted by the public at large. For example, in 2006, George W. Bush suffered defeats in advocating for Social Security and Immigration reform; and in 2013, Barack Obama was forced to backpedal from his advocacy of an intervention in the Syrian civil war. These failures in public leadership come against the backdrop of a changing communication environment as well as a changing political climate. Does the emergence of online communication help or hinder the president’s attempts at public leadership? Does this new technology force the president to respond to follow public opinion rather than to lead it? What role does increased political polarization have on the president’s ability to lead the public?”

Chapter 8: America’s World Leadership (David C. Hendrickson)

“The strategy of revolutionary overthrow—as recently witnessed in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine—is just one of the things wrong with American foreign policy, and retrenchment on that score would by no means solve all of America’s problems. But it is a start. Reflection on the purposes of American power has to begin with the choice between contrary precedents, of which the most dramatic is that between Richard Nixon in 1973 and George Bush in 2005. All questions of leadership are ultimately dependent on the worthiness of the ends that leaders seek: if the goal is misconceived, then no marshalling of allies or subtle changes in means will salvage it. Americans should appreciate their heritage of world leadership, but they should also query it. In past epochs, American leaders entertained a more modest conception of the nation’s role. They held fast to a vision of world order that has been practically abandoned in recent years. To move forward in the future, Americans need to claw their way back to the past in search of useful precedents to guide them.”

Chapter 9: Leadership in the Judicial Context (Christopher Shortell)

“Leadership is often studied through the lens of executive and legislative contexts. The judiciary has not received the same attention, which is unfortunate because understanding leadership in the judiciary requires more than simply applying existing leadership studies to judges. Studying judicial leadership requires paying careful attention to the particular institutional contexts within which judges work. The constraints and opportunities are distinct in important ways from those faced by executives and legislatures. This is not to say that leadership is unimportant in the judicial context or that existing studies of leadership do not recognize the importance of institutional constraints. Rather, it is to argue that understanding judicial leadership requires scholars to pay careful attention to when and how that leadership can emerge and operate in its particular context.”

Chapter 11: I Am an American Day (David Schmitz

“With war on the horizon, the change of focus from citizenship to wartime mobilization and the proper role of the United States in the war were reflected in the I Am an American Day events held throughout the nation. They became more about the contrast between the United States and the fascist nations, about what was necessary to protect American freedom and liberty now and in the future, than civics lessons and ceremonies on naturalization and good citizenship. Simultaneously, the crowds soared as millions of people participated across the nation.”

This book is part of the Politics, Institutions, and Public Policy in America (PIPPA) book series  (Editors: Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly). See more well-reviewed books in the Cambria Press PIPPA Series.

About the editor: Michael A. Genovese holds the Loyola Chair of Leadership Studies, and he is Professor of Political Science, Director of the Institute for
Leadership Studies, and acting President of the World Policy Institute at
Loyola Marymount University.

Like us on Facebook, subscribe to the Cambria Press Youtube channel, follow us on Twitter, and Google+1 Cambria Press .

See the Cambria Press website for more books.

NEW PUBLICATION: Doing Archival Research in Political Science is now available! Meet the editors at the 2012 ACSC conference!

Three of the editors of Doing Archival Research in Political Science, Sean Q Kelly, Scott Frisch, and David C. W. Parker, will be at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Association of Centers for the Study of Congress to discuss their book, which has been published just in time for the conference.

Doing Archival Research in Political Science by Scott A. Frisch, Douglas B. Harris, Sean Q Kelly, and David C.W. Parker has won praise from leading experts and is hailed as “simply the best treatment that we have of the practical logistics of conducting archival research about the national legislature” by C. Lawrence Evans, Newton Family Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary.

Dr. Raymond Smock (director of the Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies; former historian, U. S. House of Representatives; and past president of the Association of Centers for the Study of Congress) also praises this pioneering work, stating that “this excellent, timely, and cogently written book boldly challenges political scientists to expand their research methods to include extensive use of the rich, largely untapped, political archives of this nation” and that “this book could help bring about a revolution in the way political scientists do their work.”

This first-of-its-kind book—traversing political science and library and information science—challenges political scientists’ reliance on “easy data” promising in return “better data.” The editors propose that the archival record is replete with data that are often superior to current, available public data, both quantitative and qualitative. Substantive chapters in Doing Archival Research in Political Science illustrate how archival data improve understanding across the array of subfields in American politics. It also challenges archivists to rethink their collections through the prism of political science.

Doing Archival Research in Political Science holds tremendous cross-disciplinary appeal. Students and faculty in political science are exposed to a fertile but underutilized source of empirical data. Political scientists will benefit from the methodological perspectives, the practical advice about doing archival work, and the concrete examples of archives-based research across the subfields in American politics (e.g., congressional studies, presidential studies, public opinion, national security, interest groups, and public policy).

Students and faculty in library and archival studies will benefit greatly from the candid discussion of the unique theoretical and methodological concerns inherent in political science, improving their ability to reach out and promote their collections to political scientists. Examples of archives-based political science research will help library faculty better understand how their collections are being utilized by users.

A Q&A session will be posted after the conference for those who were not able to attend. A special ACSC discount is being offered to conference attendees.

Recommend this book to your librarian today! They can order it directly from Cambria Press or they can order through their preferred academic book wholesaler (Cambria Press is on the approval list of premier wholesalers like YBP).

STAY POSTED! Follow Cambria Press on Twitter, like Cambria Press on Facebook, and share this news from Cambria Press on Google+!